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limate change is leading to sys-
temic and existential impacts, and 
evidence is mounting that these can 
result in the displacement of human 
populations. There is a rapidly grow-
ing demand for comprehensive risk 
assessments that include displacement 
and its associated costs to inform humani-
tarian response and national planning and 
coordination. However, owing to complex 
causation, missing and incomplete data, 
and the political nature of the issue, the 
longer-term economic impacts of disaster- 
and climate-related displacement remain 
largely hidden.  Current approaches are 
rarely ex ante and prospective and do not 
consider systemic risk management. Not 
surprisingly, response-based approaches 
have shown mixed results, repeatedly de-
manding substantial resources while not 
addressing the root causes of displacement.
Climate change is not only affecting the 
intensity, frequency, and duration of haz-
ards that trigger displacement but is also 
eroding already fragile livelihoods and eco-
systems, acting as an aggravator of existing 
vulnerability and contributing to chronic 
poverty and conflict in affected countries 
(1). Although disaster risk reduction as a 
cross-sectoral issue has gained consider-
able attention over the past two decades, 
disaster displacement risk is still not fully 
integrated in national policies and plan-
ning.  Out of 46 countries included in the 
2020 Internal Displacement Index, most 
acknowledge disaster displacement in 
principle and have climate policies or na-
tional adaptation plans in place. However, 
only 27 recognize the link between the 
gradual impacts of climate change and dis-
placement (2). 
With an evidence-based, longer-term vi-
sion and investments, climate-related dis-
placement—the forced movement of peo-
ple in response to a hazard—can be averted 
and replaced by a range of measures such 
as planned relocation that is voluntary (at 
least to a large degree) and financially sup-
ported, or by building the resilience of at-
risk populations, reducing vulnerability to 
such an extent that moving is not required. 
What is missing is a risk-informed frame-
work for country-led, forward-looking ap-
proaches to make the case for substantial 
investment in effective risk reduction, du-
rable solutions for those displaced, and the 
prevention of new displacement. 
Applied risk science, using probabilis-
tic models and large empirical datasets 
compiled over the years, combined with 
insights from local empirical research and 
community assessments, now offers the op-
portunity for a step change in informed de-
cision-making. For example, the shift from 
deterministic disaster risk assessments, 
based on historical data, to state-of-the-art 
probabilistic modeling used by the insur-
ance industry, calibrated with historical 
data but including randomness to encom-
pass all possible scenarios, presents a no-
table advance in risk science that is yet to 
be fully applied to displacement risk. New 
tools and risk modeling platforms, such as 
CLIMADA run by ETH Zürich or CAPRA of 
the World Bank, can now be adapted for 
displacement risk assessments. Further, 
assessing the social and economic cost 
of displacement can provide incentives 
for transformational action and change, 
from mere response to disaster displace-
ment to proactively addressing vulner-




Disaster displacement is a global reality 
and everyday occurrence. Millions of di-
saster displacements have been system-
atically recorded since 2008—on average, 
24.5 million new movements every year 
(3). Weather-related hazards account for 
almost 90% of all these displacements 
(2), with climate change and the increas-
ing concentration of populations in areas 
exposed to storms and floods, coupled 
with socioeconomic drivers of vulnerabil-
ity, meaning that more people are at risk 
of being displaced. Demographic, histori-
cal, political, and socioeconomic factors 
determine whether people can withstand 
the impacts of a physical hazard or envi-
ronmental stressor or have to leave their 
homes. Climate change interacts with all of 
these factors, particularly where resources 
and the capacities of humans and systems 
are already stretched (4). For example, sea 
level rise results in loss of land in coastal 
areas and low-lying atolls of island states, 
forcing communities to retreat or leave the 
land altogether. Salinization can reduce 
crop yields, undermine arable land and 
freshwater availability, and force people to 
move. Increasing temperatures affect soil 
moisture and degradation, which make 
the soil susceptible to nutrient loss and 
erosion, thereby destroying the livelihood 
basis for rural communities. Glacial retreat 
and melt, loss of biodiversity, and land and 
forest degradation mean decreased eco-
system services and provisioning services, 
pushing people to move. Because climate 
change can also alter the intensity, fre-
quency, and duration of hazard events, 
climate anomalies and more devastating 
sudden-onset disasters may follow.
Most of the impacts of climate change 
only result in displacement for those vul-
nerable to them. This essential point is re-
peatedly forgotten, with important policy 
implications (5). A prosperous farmer with 
access to drip irrigation and fertilizers, re-
liable buyers, loans, and insurance will not 
be as affected by changes in rainfall pat-
terns as a smallholder subsistence farmer 
relying on the regularity of seasonal rains 
or a pastoralist in search of pasture for his 
herd. An urban dweller with an office job 
and regular income will not need to leave 
his home because of the loss of mangroves, 
which are providing sustenance to mil-
lions in coastal communities. Nonetheless, 
although individual vulnerability leads to 
a risk of adverse displacement outcomes, 
disaster and climate risks are increasingly 
becoming systemic because high-level and 
widespread impacts may ripple through 
social and economic networks, incurring 
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further adverse micro and macro impacts 
and disruptions (6).
Climate change is thus a displacement 
trigger in its own right (e.g., loss of coast-
lines through sea level rise and coastal 
erosion), a visible aggravator (e.g., when 
livelihoods are eroded because of soil deg-
radation and loss of ecosystem services), 
and a hidden aggravator (e.g., increas-
ing the intensity of cyclonic winds and 
shifting rainfall patterns that result in 
floods). But the impacts of climate change 
interact with broader changes in the physi-
cal and social environment, resulting in 
potentially rising costs associated with fu-
ture displacement.
A HEAVY BURDEN…ON NOBODY’S 
BALANCE SHEET
Disaster displacement often undermines 
the welfare and well-being of affected in-
dividuals and communities and can also 
incur a substantial social and economic 
burden on countries. Although many 
countries have begun to plan for t he risk 
of extreme events in one way or another, 
governments typically do not formally ac-
count for displacement risk and their asso-
ciated costs in national development plans 
and annual budgets of line ministries. 
Even without taking into account the ag-
gravating forces of climate change, there 
is growing evidence that displacement not 
only severely disrupts the lives of those 
forced to flee their homes but also has an 
economic impact on local communities 
and national economies (7). The direct cost 
of providing every internally displaced 
person (totaling more than 55 million in 
2020) with support for housing, education, 
health, and security has been estimated at 
US$370 per person per year, accumulating 
to more than US$20.5 billion for 2020 (2). 
These figures are mostly based on infor-
mation available from protracted conflict-
related displacement situations because 
the economic impacts of displacements 
linked with disasters and climate change 
usually go unrecorded. A key knowledge 
gap exists here because only limited event-
based or nationally aggregated data is 
available on how long people remain dis-
placed after a disaster, despite ample evi-
dence that this type of displacement is of-
ten long-term and can become protracted 
(2). These impacts can add up to billions of 
dollars worldwide. Each time one person is 
displaced, even for a few days, costs arise 
for transportation, shelter, food and non-
food items, and the loss of income if the 
person cannot continue their usual work. 
Adding in long-term consequences, such 
as lack of schooling, training, and on-the-
job experience, increases this economic 
impact. These costs should be on national 
balance sheets but are instead most often 
borne by communities themselves, by local 
governments that have to divert already 
limited development funds to response, 
and by humanitarian actors. In the face of 
increasingly severe disaster- and climate-
related displacement, these costs are only 
set to rise.
The highest economic impacts usually 
stem from the loss of income and the need 
to provide displaced people with shelter 
and health care. Disaster-resilient housing 
and livelihoods, as well as strong primary 
health care systems, are also where invest-
ments are needed most ahead of disaster 
events to reduce displacement and enable 
lasting solutions. By nature of its mandate, 
humanitarian response is not set up to in-
vest in resilient livelihoods or infrastruc-
ture and service development.
It is not only low-income nations that 
are at risk of economic impacts due to dis-
placement. During the 2019–2020 bushfires 
in Australia, the loss of economic produc-
tion as a result of people missing just one 
day of work during displacement was esti-
mated to be about US$510 per 
person (8). These costs add up, 
particularly if a disaster causes 
considerable housing destruc-
tion, which may delay people 
from returning to their homes 
for months. The cost of cover-
ing housing needs resulting 
from Australia’s Black Summer 
bushfires was estimated to 
be between US$44 million 
and US$52 million for a year, 
posing a substantial financial 
burden, given that previous 
recovery efforts indicate that 
it can take people between 




These numbers and examples 
from across the globe highlight 
that we need to get better at 
understanding and assessing 
the nature and scale of disas-
ter displacement risk. The 
coverage and detail of relevant datasets 
have improved, and various models and 
approaches exist at regional and global 
scales, although their time frames, meth-
ods, and resulting estimates vary enor-
mously. For example, the World Bank, 
using a gravity model and new data on cli-
mate change, water availability, and crop 
production, has estimated that slow-onset 
climate hazards such as water scarcity and 
declining crop yields could lead to more 
than 100 million additional internal mi-
grants in Latin America, South Asia, and 
sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 should neither 
accelerating climate impacts nor unequal 
development be adequately addressed (9).
In many such assessments, there is a 
strong focus on environmental stressors 
and hazards, and on climate change’s im-
pacts on their intensity and frequency. This 
may have potentially resulted in inflated 
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Global disaster displacement risk relative to population size
Average Annual Displacement (AAD) risk is a compact metric that represents the estimated effect, accumulated over a long 
time frame, of future small to medium and extreme events and estimates the likely displacement associated with them on 
a yearly basis for sudden-onset hazards such as tsunamis, cyclonic winds, storm surges, and riverine floods. See (10) for 
details. Each country’s AAD risk relative to its population size is shown (expected annual displacements / 10,000  people). 
Country income group classification from the World Bank.
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numbers and certainly in an 
inflated perception regarding 
the role of climate change in 
the dynamics of human mo-
bility and forced movements 
today and in the coming de-
cades. Estimates from a proba-
bilistic model that takes hous-
ing rendered uninhabitable as 
a proxy for displacement in 
sudden-onset disasters, such 
as floods and cyclones, suggest 
that  an average of around 14 
million displacements can be 
expected each year (a conser-
vative approach that is highly 
likely to be an underestimate) 
(10). This displacement risk 
is heavily concentrated in the 
Asia-Pacific region, where both 
exposure and vulnerability are 
high. Even in relative terms—
that is, numbers of potential 
displacements in relation to 
population size—displacement 
risk is high not only for South 
and East Asia but also for 
Pacific and other small island 
states (see the first figure).
Climate change as well as 
changes in population size and 
composition and of key social 
and economic indicators all 
affect how this displacement 
risk may change in the future. 
According to probabilistic, spatially ex-
plicit risk modeling that uses ensembles of 
climate models and hydrodynamic model-
ing to quantify flood hazard, is calibrated 
on past events, and incorporates commonly 
used climate change and development sce-
narios, rapidly increasing exposure due 
to population growth may be the largest 
driver of displacement risk in the future 
(11). Nevertheless, this strong role of popu-
lation size should not overshadow the fact 
that the substantial increase related to cli-
mate change is not trivial (see the second 
figure). New assessments show that we can 
expect a 50% increase in displacement risk 
related to floods for each degree of tem-
perature increase (11). Although, currently, 
various epistemic uncertainties need to be 
reckoned with, such projections serve to il-
lustrate the future burden to consider in 
a rapidly warming and changing climate.
Beyond probabilistic and deterministic 
disaster displacement risk models, there 
are other modeling approaches that can in-
creasingly be put to the task. Agent-based 
network models can assess individual-level 
impacts and costs through a bottom-up 
methodology that can reflect how shocks 
to one part of a system (community, 
economy, country, or region) can cascade 
through the whole system and also spill 
over into other systems (12). Further, a sys-
tem dynamics approach can describe in a 
relatively comprehensive manner the rela-
tionships between a wide range of dimen-
sions and indicators, although it requires 
granular datasets that are often unavail-
able and is highly cost- and labor-intensive 
to develop.
Finally, integrating risk estimates with 
analysis of public finance allows quanti-
fication of the relevance and “additional-
ity” of internal displacement impacts on 
governments’ (and often donors’) budgets. 
First attempts at undertaking this analy-
sis, adapting the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) catastro-
phe simulation model (CatSim) in support 
of public financing strategies in pre- and 
postdisaster contexts, have shown that the 
cost of internal displacement can substan-
tially increase national and global budget 
gaps (fiscal gaps) and the chance of budget 
crises (13). F or example, in Bangladesh, a 
disaster with a return period of 50 years 
can be expected to incur costs related to 
internal displacement of nearly US$4.1 bil-
lion per year of subsequent displacement; 
a smaller magnitude but more 
frequent disaster with a return 
period of 10 years would incur 
more than US$1 billion. The 
estimated possible amount of 
funding that the country may 
be able to divert from exist-
ing development budgets and 
credit buffers adds up to just 
over US$1 billion of fiscal re-
silience, which means that 
Bangladesh is likely to be un-
able to cover the costs associ-
ated with internal displace-
ment for events that occur 
every 10 years on average. 
Further estimates of such 
costs can provide the basis for 
making the case for preven-
tive action and for developing 
appropriate financial instru-
ments such as national reserve 
funds, enhanced social protec-
tion schemes, and catastro-
phe bonds, as well as regional 
or global sovereign insurance 
pools (14). Beyond these first 
steps in developing basic esti-
mates of the costs, further work 
is required to better under-
stand who bears these and how 
benefits from improved policies 
would be distributed across dif-
ferent segments of society.
INVESTING IN THE FUTURE
Comprehensive risk assessments that ac-
count for displacement risk and estimate 
its economic costs signal a need to improve 
coordination on budget allocations and 
cooperation in program execution across 
ministries and public and private sectors. 
This would enable the explicit inclusion of 
these contingent risks into budget stress-
testing procedures and other risk-man-
agement planning processes. It would also 
provide incentives for managing risk with 
an ex ante approach, because it anticipates 
the ex post consequences and trade-offs in-
volved in responding to shocks (13). 
Risk assessments should help communi-
ties and local and national governments 
grappling with immediate displacement 
risk or the prospect of intensifying natu-
ral hazards or loss of territory or habitats. 
More financing must be made available for 
localized, granular displacement risk as-
sessments, which municipalities can use to 
inform urban development plans, zoning 
regulations, and local building codes and 
for forward-looking, long-term planning 
for relocation where necessary.
Recent attempts at providing a measure 
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Historical
baseline
RCP, representative concentration pathway; GHG, greenhouse gas; SSP, shared socioeconomic pathway
RCP6.0-SSP4
High GHG emissions rate with a 
highly unequal development path
RCP2.6-SSP1
Stronger GHG mitigation e1orts, 
where the world shifts toward a 
more sustainable development 
path, aiming to keep global 
warming below 2°C above 
preindustrial temperatures
Change in flood displacement risk 
Shaded areas show different scenarios of flood displacement risk based on a 
range of climate and hydrological models, relative to historical baseline. The 
width of the shading represents an estimate of the uncertainty induced by natural 
climate variability and limitations in current understanding of the climate system 
and hydrological systems. Dashed lines show the average values across models. 
Historical baseline is defined by the average flood hazard frequency and intensity 
from 1976 to 2005, combined with population data for 2000. RCPs reflect different 
trajectories of variation in atmospheric GHG concentrations. SSPs reflect different 
scenarios of global socioeconomic development. Modified from (11). 
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only the first step. In the coming years, fur-
ther investment should build on the prom-
ises of longer-term risk modeling and cou-
ple its results with impact assessments so 
that countries can build displacement es-
timates into their multiyear development 
plans (15). Understanding needs and pri-
orities in the decision-making processes of 
affected populations, institutional capaci-
ties, and socioeconomic dynamics, even if 
less systematically assessed, will be at least 
as important at indicating what the future 
holds. Given the scope and complexity of 
the problem, a pluralistic methodological 
setup is required to contribute to a better 
understanding of displacement risk and to 
inform effective policy and response under 
a broad range of circumstances. j
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Pathways to coastal retreat
The shrinking solution space for adaptation calls for 
long-term dynamic planning starting now
By Marjolijn Haasnoot1,2, Judy Lawrence3, 
Alexandre K. Magnan4,5
T
here is an urgent need to take coastal 
retreat more seriously as an option 
for adapting to sea level rise (SLR) 
and as a strategy capable of provid-
ing positive outcomes, if planned 
ahead. Early signs of such think-
ing are emerging. We demonstrate how 
exploring pathways to managed retreat 
adds value in the context of irreversible 
long-term SLR. Retreat is typically framed 
and understood as a single action, largely 
used after events rather than preemptively, 
and considered as a last resort. However, 
implementing managed retreat constitutes 
a multidecadal sequence of actions (i.e., 
across pathways) including community en-
gagement, vulnerability assessment, land 
use planning, active retreat, compensa-
tion, and repurposing. This Policy Forum 
advances practical knowledge on what 
pathways to coastal retreat may look like 
and how they can pave the way for flexible 
and positive transformational adaptation, 
if started now.
SHRINKING SOLUTION SPACE
SLR globally accelerated from 1.4 mm/year 
(1901–1990) to 3.6 mm/year (2006–2015) 
and will continue to do so during this cen-
tury (10 to 20 mm/year in 2100) ( 1). Sea 
levels could rise between 0.43 and 0.84 m 
globally by 2100, relative to 1986–2005, 
as a median estimate under low and high 
emission scenarios, respectively. However, 
a rise of 2 m by 2100 cannot be ruled out 
(1). There is also a clear commitment to 
SLR centuries into the future due to iner-
tia in both the climate and ocean systems; 
for every degree of warming, sea levels will 
eventually rise ~2.3 m (2).
Inexorable SLR makes some degree of re-
location of coastal residents, buildings, in-
frastructure, and activities inevitable, even 
if global warming is mitigated to 1.5° or 2°C. 
The necessity of paying more serious atten-
tion to pathways to managed retreat is be-
coming urgent (3). To begin with, observed 
coastal flooding is already reaching unac-
ceptable levels for communities and infra-
structure in many low-lying coastal settle-
ments around the world (1), and unless 
adaptation starts now, in a few generations, 
more regions (e.g., small islands, parts of 
the US coast, major deltas) will be at risk of 
coastal flooding (1). Additionally, retreat re-
quires decadal lead time to plan and imple-
ment equitably (3, 4). Furthermore, many 
decisions taken today have a long legacy ef-
fect and create path dependencies, closing 
off some options in the future. For example, 
coastal defenses last for many decades and 
protected areas attract people and assets, 
which lead to expectations of further pro-
tection. On the other hand, creating space 
for wetlands to grow as sea levels rise pro-
vides a temporary buffer, keeping future op-
tions open for later development or a lower 
barrier to retreat. 
Ongoing and accelerating SLR, com-
pounded with other climate-related 
changes (e.g., intensification of extreme 
events such as storms, heavy rainfall, and 
river flows) and increasing population at 
the coast, is already progressively shrink-
ing the solution space of available adap-
tation options. Accommodation options 
(e.g., elevated buildings, early warning, 
and shelter) will not be enough to reduce 
coastal risks to acceptable levels under 
SLR-induced flooding and erosion. As sea 
levels rise, groundwater salinization will 
render water supplies unusable and limit 
food production to saline-tolerant crops. 
Nor will nature-based solutions, such as 
offshore reefs or wetland restoration, be 
likely to keep pace with combined climate 
change impacts (1) and human pressures 
that have reduced space and sediment sup-
ply to the coast. Such responses are there-
fore expected to be only temporary adapta-
tions in many places (5). 
Hard protection, either through holding 
the line (protect) or advancing seaward 
(advance) using levees, barriers, or artifi-
cial islands, can be beneficial, for example, 
in resource-rich megacities but also has 
limitations, as sustained and rapid SLR 
would make it increasingly difficult to ex-
tend infrastructure within available time 
frames (6). Also, hard protection will not 
be an affordable long-term solution for 
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